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THE FACT-OPINION DILEMMA IN FIRST AMENDMENT
DEFAMATION LAW
A great deal of confusion has been generated by courts attempting to distin-
guish fact from opinion in recent defamation cases. Lacking any clear gui-
dance from the Supreme Court on this matter, courts have desperately sought
ways to tell the difference between actionable statements offact and nonaction-
able expressions of opinion. This Note examines the various approaches that
have developed to accomplish this task. The general conclusion reached is that
no approach is foolproof and that the problem is best resolved by concentrating
on the constitutional principles and interests at stake.
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INTRODUCTION
Under current defamation law, defamatory expressions of opinion
are generally considered nonactionable.1 Defamatory statements of
false fact, however, receive no such deference.2 This disparity of
treatment is not based necessarily on the premise that all opinion is
innocuous or impotent. Although much opinion is relatively harm-
less, the incredible power and influence of the modem media is ca-
pable of elevating even a simple expression of opinion into a
statement quite capable of devastating a reputation. Rather, the pro-
tection given to expression of opinion is based more on principles of
1. A defamatory communication is "one which tends to hold the plaintiff up to
contempt or ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided." W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 739 (4th ed. 1971). Under the Restatement, a defam-
atory statement in the form of an opinion "is actionable only if it implies the allega-
tion of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977). See infra notes 142-75 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
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free speech and press governed by the first amendment.3
Freedom to express opinions, particularly on matters of public in-
terest,4 is encouraged as a matter of public policy.5 It is felt that, on
balance, the social gain inherent in the free interchange of opinion
far exceeds the injury to reputation that such comment might cause,
particularly to those persons in the public eye. 6 Although such free-
dom inevitably produces erroneous, as well as praiseworthy opinion,
it is felt that, in a free society, erroneous opinion is "corrected" by
"the competition of other ideas." 7 To allow the propriety of an
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall
make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peacea-
bly to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." (em-
phasis added).
4. The Supreme Court has recently noted that it is speech on matters of public,
rather than private, concern that is the focus of first amendment protection. See Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755-63 (1985). As
stated by Justice Powell in Greenmoss: "We have long recognized that not all speech is
of equal importance. It is speech on 'matters of public concern' that is 'at the heart of
the First Amendment's protection.'" Id. at 758-59 (footnote omitted) (quoting First
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
5. See generally R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 156 (1980).
6. Id.; see also Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 678 (1942); Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711, 713 (Alaska
1966); Fisher v. Washington Post Co., 212 A.2d 335, 337 (D.C. 1965).
7. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1964). The premise that in a
free society erroneous opinion is "corrected" by "the competition of other ideas"
provides the foundation for our system of free speech and press. It is felt that such
freedom of expression is a necessary condition to our society's quest for truth. As
the Supreme Court has recently stated: "The First Amendment presupposes that the
freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty-and thus a
good unto itself-but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality
of society as a whole." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
503-04, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984).
This theory, characterized as the "marketplace of ideas" theory of free speech,
has emerged in the opinions of some of our most revered jurists. The concurring
opinion ofJustice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), is a classi-
cal exposition of this theory in the first amendment context:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State
was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government
the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty
both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of
happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that free-
dom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be subtle; that with them, discussion affords or-
dinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine;
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discus-
sion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government. They recognized the risks to which all human insti-
tutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely
through fear or punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discour-
age thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repres-
[Vol. 13
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opinion to be subject to correction in a court of law would, therefore,
greatly compromise our system of free speech and press. To be cer-
tain, not all erroneous opinion is "corrected" by "the competition of
other ideas." However, when the alternative is judicial intervention
and corresponding self-censorship, it is clear that some erroneous
statements must be tolerated. 8 As Judge Learned Hand once said,
the first amendment "[piresupposes that the right conclusions are
more likely to be reached out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and al-
ways will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all."9
sion breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and pro-
posed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they
eschewed silence coerced by law - the argument in its worst form. Recogniz-
ing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Con-
stitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.
Id. at 375-76 (footnote omitted); see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 546-
53 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-
31 (1919) (Holmes, C.J., dissenting).
The "marketplace of ideas" theory of free speech apparently has its roots in free-
market economic theory. Professor Schauer details this analogy:
Under this theory .... truth will most likely surface when all opinions may
freely be expressed, when there is an open and unregulated market for the
trade in ideas. By relying on the operation of the market to evaluate any
opinion, we subject opinions to a test more reliable than the appraisal of any
one individual or government .... The theory can be said to rest in part on
the value of an adversary process as a means of discovering truth. The An-
glo-American legal system uses the adversary system to determine the facts
in a court of law. So also, according to the argument from truth, should
society enshrine the adversary system as the method of determining truth in
any field of enquiry. Freedom of speech can be likened to the process of
cross-examination. As we use cross examination to test the truth of direct
evidence in a court of law, so should we allow (and encourage) freedom to
criticize in order to test and evaluate accepted facts and receive opinion.
Undergirding the analogy to cross-examination is an additional analogy to
economic theory. Just as Adam Smith's "invisible hand" will ensure that the
best products emerge from free competition, so too will an invisible hand
ensure that the best ideas emerge when all opinions are permitted freely to
compete.
F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRYI6 (1982); see also J. MILTON,
AEROPAGrrICA - A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING (1644); J. S.
MILL, ON LIBERY, ch. Il (1859).
8. As put by Judge Jasen of the New York Court of Appeals: "Erroneous opin-
ions are inevitably put forward in free debate but even the erroneous opinion must
be protected so that debate on public issues may remain robust and unfettered and
concerned individuals may have the necessary freedom to speak their conscience."
Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 380, 366 N.E.2d 1299,
1306, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 950, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); cf. New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-81 (under certain circumstances, false statements
of fact are protected to ensure vigorous public discussion as well).
9. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
Professor Schauer explains this point as follows:
Although the public may not be the body to identify most effectively sound
1987]
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Erroneous statements of fact, on the other hand, stand on less
sturdy constitutional ground.10 There is no social value in the in-
terchange of false statements of fact. i t Furthermore, since a state-
ment of fact can only be evaluated in terms of truth or falsity, there is
no infringement on freedom of expression by permitting a judge or
jury to determine the veracity of such statements.
These differences justify the favorable treatment of expressions of
opinion in defamation law. They also require some meaningful way
to determine which types of statements should be privileged and
which should not. Unfortunately, the fact-opinion distinction does
not lend itself to easy resolution. The endeavor of distinguishing
expressions of opinion from statements of fact has been criticised by
both legal scholars12 and courts.' 3 One well-respected commentator
policies and true statements, its size and diversity make it the ideal body to
offer the multitude of ideas that are the fuel of the engine for advancing
knowledge. By allowing the freest expression of opinion, we increase the
number of alternatives and the number of challenges to received opinion. If
some proportion of currently rejected ideas are correct, then increasing the
pool of ideas will in all probability increase the total number of correct ideas
in circulation, and available to those who can identify them as correct.
F. SCHAUER, supra note 7, at 27-28.
10. As Justice Powell stated in Gertz:
[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the
intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues. They belong
to that category of utterances which "are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality."
418 U.S. at 340 (citations omitted).
11. Id.
12. The defects inherent in the fact-opinion distinction have probably been
stated best by Professor Wigmore in his treatise on evidence:
[I]t is obvious (leaving out the history and considering only the principle)
that there is no virtue in any test based on the mere verbal or logical distinc-
tion between "opinion" and "fact".... In the first place no such distinc-
tion is scientifically possible .... [Als soon as we come to analyze and
define these terms for the purpose of accuracy which is necessary in legal
rulings, we find that the distinction.., between "opinion" and "fact" is that
the one is certain and sure, the other not, surely a just view of their psycho-
logical relation serves to demonstrate that in strict truth nothing is certain.
Or we prefer the suggestion of G.C. Lewis that the test is whether "doubt
can reasonably exist," then certainly it must be perceived that the multiple
doubts which ought to exist would exclude vast masses of indubitably ad-
missible testimony. Or if we prefer the idea that "opinion is inference and
fact is "original perception," then it must be understood that no such dis-
tinction can scientifically be made, since the processes of knowledge and the
sources of illusion are the same for both.
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1919 (1978); see also W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 820 (the
fact-opinion distinction "has proved to be a most unsatisfactory and unreliable one,
difficult to draw in practice").
13. See OlIman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1001-02 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., con-
curring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); see also Pearson, 413 P.2d at 714 ("[t]he
[Vol. 13
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has stated: "No task undertaken under the law of defamation is any
more elusive than distinguishing between the two." 14 The difficulty
stems from the fact that there is no readily discernable boundary be-
tween fact and opinion.15 Rather, most statements are said to lie
somewhere on a continuum between pure opinion and pure fact.16
Unfortunately, courts have had an exceedingly difficult time deter-
mining where and how to mark the boundaries on this continuum in
defamation suits.
Various courts17 and commentators' 8 have devised different ways
to make this elusive distinction between fact and opinion, or avoid it
altogether.'9 Seldom, however, are the analytical underpinnings of
the opinion privilege ever explored or articulated. Instead, courts
"enunciate such things as four-factor frameworks, three-pronged
tests, and two-tiered analyses" 20 to deal with this problem. Needless
to say, confusion and unpredictability abound in this area of the law.
This Note will attempt to explain some of the various approaches
that have developed to deal with statements in the form of opinions
in defamation law. The Note will first review some of the common
law foundations of this area of the law, principally the qualified privi-
lege of fair comment.2' Supreme Court adjudication affecting this
area of the law will then be examined. 22 The Note will then discuss
some of the current approaches to the opinion problem in defama-
tion law, namely the "totality of circumstances" approach,23 and Sec-
tion 566 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.24 The general conclusion
reached by this Note is that, in most cases, it is futile to attempt to
draw any bright line between fact and opinion and that the problem
distinction between a fact statement and an opinion ... is so tenuous in most in-
stances, that any attempt to distinguish between the two will lead to needless
confusion").
14. R. SACK, supra note 5, at 155.
15. See Oilman, 750 F.2d at 1021-23 (S. Robinson, CJ., dissenting in part).
16. Id. at 1021.
17. See infra notes 76-103 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need
for a Bright-line Rule, 72 GEO. LJ. 1817, 1851-53 (1984) (requiring publishers to label
their commentaries as "opinion" by placing them strictly on the editorial page would
greatly facilitate the distinction).
19. See, e.g., Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and
Falsity, 25 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 825, 869-85 (1984) (same); Comment, Structuring
Defamation Law to Eliminate the Fact Opinion Determination: A Critique of Olman v. Evans,
71 IOWA L. REV. 913 (1986) (since opinions cannot be false, requiring plaintiff to
prove falsity will eliminate the need for the court to make the fact-opinion
distinction).
20. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 994 (Bork, J., concurring).
21. See infra notes 31-58 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 76-137 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 138-211 and accompanying text.
1987]
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is best resolved by concentrating on the principles and interests at
stake.
I. BACKGROUND
Before the United States Supreme Court began applying constitu-
tional principles to defamation law,25 common-law principles gener-
ally controlled. Early defamation law was essentially a law of strict
liability; the plaintiff bore no burden of proving fault on the part of
the defendant.26 The plaintiff had only to offer the alleged defama-
tory statement into evidence. The court then determined whether
the statement was capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. 27 If the
statement was found not to be defamatory, judgment was entered for
the defendant. If, however, the statement was determined to have a
defamatory meaning, it was then for a jury to decide whether, in fact,
the statement had been interpreted in its defamatory sense. 28
Initially, truth was the only available defense.29 Defendants had a
particularly difficult time of pleading and proving truth, however, be-
cause once the plaintiffs had established the defamatory content of
the publication, a presumption of falsity attached.3o Therefore,
statements incapable of being proven true or false, namely opinions,
necessarily led to verdicts in favor of plaintiffs.31
This early defamation scheme eventually proved to be unsatisfac-
tory. A certain tension inevitably developed between the defend-
25. Supreme Court adjudication in defamation law has dealt mainly with the
standard of fault applicable in defamation suits. See infra notes 237-49 and accompa-
nying text.
26. According to the Restatement, a defamation plaintiff had the burden of
proving:
(a) the defamatory character of the communication;
(b) its publication by the defendant;
(c) its application to the plaintiff;
(d) the recipient's understanding of its defamatory meaning;
(e) the recipient's understanding of it as intended to be applied to the
plaintiff;
(f) special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication; and
(g) abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 613 (1938). The plaintiff bore no burden of proving fault
on the part of the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant's intent, even if wholly
innocent, was considered irrelevant. Liability arose if there had been an "un-
privileged publication of false and defamatory matter." Id. § 558. It made no differ-
ence whether the defendant did not intend the matter to be defamatory or to harm
the plaintiff's reputation. See id. § 580.
27. See id. § 614 (1).
28. Id. § 614(2).
29. The truth of a defamatory statement of fact operated as a complete defense
to an action for defamation. See id. § 582.
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A comments a and b (1977); see
also W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 804; R. SACK, supra note 5, at 134.
31. See Note, Fair Comment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1212-13 (1949).
[Vol. 13
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ant's freedom of expression and the plaintiff's interest in protecting
his reputation.3 2 It was recognized that certain types of statements,
incapable of being proven true or false in any objective sense of
those terms, should be entitled to a limited form of immunity.33
This led to the establishment of the qualified privilege of fair
comment.3 4
In most cases where the defendant could not prove the truth of his
defamatory statement, the privilege of fair comment became his only
hope. This privilege, however, was of limited availability. In order
to qualify as fair comment, the criticism had to meet at least three
requirements: (1) it had to relate to a matter of "public concern," 35
(2) it had to be based on facts truly stated36 or "otherwise known or
available," 3 7 and (3) it could not be made maliciously, i.e., it had to
represent the critic's actual opinion,38 and it could not be made for
the sole purpose of causing harm to another.39
Fair comment permitted a publisher to critize only so much of an-
other's activities that were of a public concern.40 The defendant was
required to satisfy the court that the subject matter of his comment
was of such interest to the public that he should be free to make it
despite the injury to the plaintiff's reputation.41 Typically, those
who were subject to fair comment included:
persons, institutions or groups who voluntarily injected themselves
into the public scene or affected the community's welfare, such as
public officials, political candidates, community leaders from the
private sector or private enterprises which affected public welfare,
persons taking a public position on a matter of public concern, and
those who offered their creations for public approval such as art-
ists, performers and athletes.42
To qualify as fair comment, the criticism also had to represent the
actual opinion of the publisher and could not be made solely for the
32. See id.; see also A. MIEKLEJOHN, POLrrCAL FREEDOM, ch. 1 (1960).
33. See Note, supra note 31, at 1207-09.
34. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 (1938).
35. See id. § 606.
36. See id. § 606(l)(a)(i).
37. See i. § 606(l)(a)(ii).
38. See id. § 606(l)(b).
39. See id. § 606(l)(c).
40. See id. comment a. Comment on the private lives of public figures or officials
was permitted only to the extent that their private conduct affected their public char-
acter. Id. comment e. For such comment to be privileged, it additionally could "not
be so fantastic that a man of reasonable judgment and intelligence could not enter-
tain it." Id. comment f. In effect, comment on a public official's or public figure's
private life had to be reasonable.
41. See id. § 613 (2)(c); Note, supra note 31, at 1207.
42. Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 882 (La. 1977) (citation omitted); see also
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 comment a (1938); R. SACK, supra note 5, at 169-72.
1987]
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purpose of causing harm to the plaintiff.43 As one commentator has
put it: "Implicit in the term 'fair comment' is the requirement that
opinions be 'fair.' "44 Accordingly, the Restatement, in addition to re-
quiring that the criticism be the critic's actual opinion, required "that
it be published in part at least for the purpose of giving to the public
the benefit of the opinion which they are entitled to know." 45 If the
criticism was published "solely from spite or ill will and for the pur-
pose of causing harm to the person criticised," it was not
privileged.46
Finally, to qualify as fair comment, the facts supporting the criti-
cism had to be disclosed or otherwise known to the recipient.47
Moreover, the facts upon which the criticism was based had to be
true, or if they were not true, the critic must have been privileged to
state them.48 Disclosure was required so that the recipient of the
communication could judge for himself the propriety of the author's
deductions from the facts.49 It was felt that "[a]n unsound comment
on disclosed facts should reflect more on the person making it than
the person about whom the comment is made."50 If the supporting
facts were not disclosed, however, the comment carried with it the
implication of supporting facts and was thus "more than the mere
43. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 and comment d (1938); see also Post Pub-
lishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 539 (6th Cir. 1893); Cherry v. Des Moines Leader,
114 Iowa 298, 303-04, 86 N.W. 323, 323 (1901); Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan.
711, 739-42, 98 P. 281, 281-82 (1908); Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353, 359, 83
N.W. 110, 112 (1900).
44. R. SACK, supra note 5, at 174 (citations ommitted).
45. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 comment d (1938).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 606 (l)(a)(ii). As put by the drafters of Section 606:
Comment or criticism is an expression of the opinion of the commmentator
or critic upon the facts commented upon or criticised. If the facts are not
known, a statement, though in form the expression of an opinion, carries
with it the implication of facts to support it and is thus more than the mere
expression of an opinion. To be privileged comment under the rule stated
in this Section, therefore, the facts upon which the opinion is based must be
stated or they must be known or readily available to the persons to whom
the comment or criticism is addressed, as in the case of a newspaper criti-
cism of a play or a review of a book.
Id. comment b (citation omitted).
48. Id. § 606(1)(a)(i); see also id. comment b.
49. See R. SACK, supra note 5, at 165-66; see also Parsons v. Age-Herald Publishing
Co., 181 Ala. 439, 450, 61 So. 345, 350 (1913); Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publish-
ing Co., 230 Miss. 583, 591, 93 So. 2d 171, 173 (1957); Coleman v. Newark Morning
Ledger Co., 29 N.J. 357, 381-82, 149 A.2d 193, 206 (1959); Leers v. Green, 24 N.J.
239, 250-53, 131 A.2d 781, 787-88 (1957).
50. R. SACK, supra note 5, at 166; see also Kapiloffv. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 544
n.33, 343 A.2d 251, 270 n.33 (1975) ("[i]f an individual publishes an unreasonable
opinion based on vague and invalid standards he libels himself and not the object of
his opinion."), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
[Vol. 13
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expression of an opinion."51 One well-respected commentator ex-
plained the rationale behind the disclosure requirement as follows:
The distinction is fundamental, then, between comment upon
given facts and the direct assertion of facts .... If the facts are
stated separately, and the comment appears as an inference drawn
from those facts, any injustice that the imputation might occasion is
practically negatived by reason of the fact that the reader has
before him the grounds upon which the unfavorable inference is
based. When the facts are truthfully stated, comment thereon, if
unjust, will fall harmless, for the former furnish a ready antidote
for the latter. The reader is then in a position to judge whether the
critic has not by his unfairness or prejudice libelled himself rather
than the object of his animadversion. But if a bare statement is
made in terms of a fact, or if facts and comment are so intermin-
gled that it is not clear what purports to be inference and what is
claimed to be fact, the reader will naturally assume that the injuri-
ous statements are based upon adequate grounds known to the
writer.5 2
Illustrative of the disclosure requirement under fair comment is
Eikhoffv. Gilbert.53 In Eikhoff, a circular addressed to voters, request-
ing them to vote against the incumbent political candidate "because
in the last legislature he championed measures opposed to the moral
interests of the community," 54 was not entitled to protection under
fair comment. 5 5 Since the factual basis for this assertion had not
been made specific, "it afforded no one an opportunity to judge
whether the statement was a proper deduction from the facts upon
which it was based or not." 56 If, however, the underlying facts had
been disclosed, the statement would clearly have been privileged.
This would be true even though the comment was unreasonable or
highly vituperative. As stated by the drafters of Section 606: "If the
public is to be aided in forming its judgment upon matters of public
interest by a free interchange of opinion, it is essential that honest
criticism and comment no matter how foolish or prejudiced, be privi-
leged."57 Accordingly, as long as the comment bore some relation-
51. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 comment b.
52. Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 419-20 (1910).
53. 124 Mich. 353, 83 N.W. 110 (1900).
54. Id. at 354, 83 N.W. at 111.
55. Id. at 357, 83 N.W. at 114.
56. Id. at 356, 83 N.W. at 113.
57. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 comment c (1938). This principle apparently
derives its origin from the "marketplace of ideas" theory of free speech expounded
by John Stuart Mill and John Milton. See supra note 7. Mill's argument has been
paraphrased as follows:
Only by allowing expression of the opinion we think false do we allow for
the possiblity that that opinion may be true. Allowing contrary opinions to
be expressed is the only way to give ourselves the opportunity to reject the
received opinion when the received opinion is false. A policy of suppressing
1987]
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ship to the facts upon which it was based, it made no difference how
erroneous it appeared to be.58
In summary, the privilege of fair comment permitted publishers to
criticize only so much of a person's activities that were of a public
concern. To qualify as fair comment, the criticism also had to repre-
sent the actual opinion of the publisher and could not be made solely
for the purpose of causing harm to the plaintiff. The most important
requirement under fair comment, however, involved the disclosure
of supporting facts. The drafters of the Restatement recognized the
intimate relationship between the disclosure requirement and the
constitutional principles underlying the opinion privilege. Criticism
under the first amendment is privileged because it has the capacity to
be "corrected" by the "competition of other ideas." However, in
order for the "competition of other ideas" to be an effective correc-
tion device, opinion must indeed have the capacity to be corrected.
As the drafters of the Restatement realized, this generally requires that
the critic disclose the basis of his opinion, i.e., the underlying facts.
II. SUPREME COURT ADJUDICATION AFFECTING THE
FAIR COMMENT PRIVILEGE
Prior to 1974, the Supreme Court did not decide any cases having
a direct bearing on the privilege of fair comment. Rarely was the
privilege even addressed.59 The only case in which the Court gave
fair comment serious consideration was New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van.6 0 In Sullivan, the defendant newspaper company printed a polit-
ical advertisement which included several false statements of fact
concerning repressive police action against civil rights demonstra-
tors in Montgomery, Alabama.6 1 The plaintiff, Sullivan, Commis-
sioner of Public Affairs, brought suit alleging that since the conduct
of Montgomery police was his responsibility, the advertisement of
police misconduct was, in effect, an advertisement of his own mis-
false beliefs will in fact suppress some true ones, and therefore a policy of
suppression impedes the search for truth.
F. SCHAUER, supra note 7, at 22.
58. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 comment c. If the comment bears no ra-
tional relationship to the facts upon which it is made, "it may well be taken to imply
the existence of other undisclosed defamatory facts." Id. (citation omitted).
59. In several cases, although it did not have the opportunity to apply it, the
Court did recognize the continuing role of the fair comment privilege. See Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152 n.18 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 409 n.6 (1967) (Harlan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Rosenblatt
v. Bauer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76-77 n.10
(1964); Farmers Educ. & Cooperative Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525,
530 (1959).
60. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
61. See id. at 256-64.
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conduct.62 Due to the factual nature of the statements at issue, the
fair comment defense was not raised at trial;63 however, the Supreme
Court, in a footnote, raised the fair comment issue:
Insofar as the proposition means only that the statements about
police conduct libeled respondent by implicitly criticizing his abil-
ity to run the Police Department, recovery is also precluded in this
case by the doctrine of fair comment. Since the Fourteenth
Amendment requires recognition of the conditional privilege for
honest misstatements of fact, it follows that a defense of fair com-
ment must be afforded for honest expressions of opinion based
upon privileged, as well as true, statements of fact. Both defenses
are of course defensible if the public official proves actual malice,
as was not done here.64
Ten years later, a profound change in the law of fair comment was
initiated as a result of dicta found in the Court's opinion in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.65 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, penned
what has become the cornerstone of the absolute privilege for
opinion:
We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opin-
ion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience
of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But
there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.6 6
This reiteration of the classical "marketplace of ideas" theory of free
speech67 has been interpreted as transforming the common law qual-
ified privilege of fair comment into the absolute constitutional privilege
of opinion. The Court's assertion that, as a matter of constitutional
law, there can be "no such thing as a false idea," together with the
implication that only a falsehood is actionable in a defamation suit,
has lead to a rather unfortunate syllogism: "A defamation is actiona-
ble only if it is false; opinions cannot be false; therefore opinions can
never be actionable even if defamatory."68
When the Gertz dicta is interpreted as granting absolute protection
to all opinion, it becomes irrelevant whether the defendant's criti-
cism is of a "public concern," 6 9 or whether the criticism is made
solely for the purpose of causing harm to the plaintiff,70 or most im-
62. Id. at 258-60.
63. The trial judge ruled that the statements in the advertisement were libelous
per se. See id. at 262-64.
64. d. at 292 n.30 (citations omitted); see also infra notes 242-44 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the New York Times "actual malice" standard).
65. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
66. Id. at 339-40 (footnote omitted).
67. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
68. R. SACK, supra note 5, at 154 (emphasis added).
69. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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portantly, whether there has been a proper disclosure of supporting
facts.71 In effect, when the Gertz dicta is interpreted in this manner,
the traditional requirements under the privilege of fair comment no
longer apply. Whether this result was intended or not,72 the Ameri-
can Law Institute,7S as well as the majority of lower courts, 74 have
accepted the dicta as controlling law.
III. THE GERTZ AFTERMATH
The demise of the qualified privilege of fair comment has, unfortu-
nately, given new life to the struggle to distinguish fact from opinion.
Interpreting Gertz as granting absolute protection for opinion, courts
have desperately sought ways to distinguish nonactionable expres-
sions of opinion from actionable statements of fact. 75 Basically, two
71. See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 566 comment c (1977). The Ameri-
can Law Institute, however, has not completely accepted the absolute protection for
opinion suggested by Gertz. According to the Restatement, the Gertz dictum only ap-
plies to "pure" opinions. See id. comment b. A "pure" opinion "occurs when the
maker of the comment states the facts on which he bases his opinion of the plaintiff
and then expresses a comment as to the plaintiff's conduct, qualifications, or charac-
ter." Id. In effect, although giving recognition to the Gertz dicta, the Restatement has
retained the disclosure requirement found under the privilege of fair comment. See
infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
74. Although the "public concern" and "absence of malice" requirements are no
longer applicable to statements in the form of opinion, at least in the same way they
applied under fair comment, see infra notes 237-51 and accompanying text, most
courts have interpreted Gertz in the same manner as the Restatement, holding that it
applies only to expressions of "pure" opinion. See, e.g., Keller v. Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co., 778 F.2d 711, 718 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Lauderback v. American Broadcast-
ing Co., 741 F.2d 193, 195-98 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985);
Hammerhead Enter., Inc. v. Brezenoff, 707 F.2d 33, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
892 (1983); Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 552-56 (9th Cir. 1983); Church of
Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272, 1286 (5th Cir. 1981); Avins v. White, 627
F.2d 637, 642 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586
F.2d 1108, 1114-15 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979); Buckley v. Lit-
tell, 539 F.2d 882, 896 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); see also Mac-
Connell v. Mitten, 131 Ariz. 22, 25, 638 P.2d 689, 692 (1981); Goodrich v.
Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 117-18, 448 A.2d 1317, 1324
(1982); Hearst Corp. v. Hughes, 297 Md. 112, 131, 466 A.2d 486, 495-96 (1983);
Pritsker v. Brudnoy, 389 Mass. 776, 778, 452 N.E.2d 227, 228-31 (1983); Henry v.
Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 782 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); Nevada Indep. Broadcasting
Corp. v. Allen, 99 Nev. 404, 410, 664 P.2d 337, 342-43 (1983); Dairy Stores, Inc. v.
Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125, 135, 516 A.2d 220, 231 (1986); Steinhilber v.
Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 289-90, 501 N.E.2d 550, 552-53, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903-
04 (1986); Havalunch, Inc. v. Mozza, 294 S.E.2d 70, 75 (W. Va. 1981).
75. For a good discussion of the various approaches courts have devised to dis-
tinguish expressions of opinion from statements of fact, see Note, Fact and Opinion
After Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Evolution of a Privilege, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 80, 104-
14 (1981). See also Note, supra note 18, at 1830-45.
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approaches have emerged to deal with this problem: the "totality of
circumstances" approach and the approach suggested in Section 566
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
A. The "Totality of Circumatances" Approach
Several courts have adopted what is known as the "totality of cir-
cumstances" approach to distinguishing statements of fact from ex-
pressions of opinion.76 Under the "totality of circumstances"
approach, a court is required to "analyze the totality of circum-
stances in which the statements are made to decide .. whether the
average reader would view the statement[s] as fact or, conversely,
opinion."77 Essentially, the "totality of circumstances approach" is a
76. See, e.g.,Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1302; Oilman, 750 F.2d at 979; Information Con-
trol Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980);
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 644 F. Supp. 1240, 1255-57 (N.D.
Ill. 1986); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 638 F. Supp. 1149, 1154
(D.D.C. 1986); Karp v. Hill and Knowlton, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 360, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Price v. Viking Press, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 641, 646-48 (D.Minn. 1985).
77. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 979. In Oilman, plaintiff Bertoll Oilman sued syndicated
columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak for libel. In March 1978, Ollman, a
political science professor at New York University, was nominated by a departmental
search committee to head the Department of Government and politics at the Univer-
sity of Maryland. Id. at 972. This nomination, however, proved to be quite contro-
versial due to Oilman's avowed Marxist political beliefs. Id.
In the heat of this controversy, Evans and Novak wrote a column entitled "The
Marxist Professor's Intentions." See Evans and Novak, The Marxist Professor's Intentions,
Wash. Post, May 4, 1978, at A27, col. 4. The article appeared in The Washington Post
and other major newspapers across the country. The article generally characterized
Oilman as nothing more than a "political activist" with designs of using his class-
room as an instrument "to convert students to socialism." Id. It is not surprising
that Oilman never received the appointment.
In analyzing Oilman, three statements made by Evans and Novak are of particular
concern. Oilman claimed the following comments were defamatory statements of
fact:
(1) His candid writings avow his desire to use the classroom as an instrument for
preparing what he calls "the revolution." Oilman, 750 F.2d at 972 (empha-
sis in original).
(2) While Oilman is described in new accounts as a "respected Marxist scholar," he is
widely viewed in his profession as a political activist. Id. (emphasis in
original).
(3) Referring to Oilman's principal scholarly work: Such pampleteering is
hooted at by one political scientist in a major eastern university, whose scholarship
and reputation as a liberal are well known. "Oilman has no status within the
profession, but is a pure and simple activist," he said. Id. at 973. (Emphasis in
original).
After examining the above statements, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia entered summary judgment in favor of Evans and Novak. See
Oilman v. Evans, 479 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2662 (1985). The court characterized the
statement as constitutionally protected opinion. 479 F. Supp. at 294. Oilman ap-
pealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
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conglomeration of various other approaches developed by courts at-
tempting to distinguish between fact and opinion.78 The approach
consists of the following four factors: (1) the precision of the lan-
guage used;79 (2) the verifiability of the statements made;80 (3) the
literary context in which the statements were made;8 1 and (4) the
broader social context in which the statements were made.8 2
In considering the precision of the language used by a defendant,
a court is required to determine whether the allegedly defamatory
statement has a precise meaning and, thus, is likely to give rise to
"clear factual implications."8 3 Whether a particular statement is ca-
pable of creating "clear factual implications" depends on "social
normative systems."8 4 The example frequently given is the accusa-
tion of criminal conduct. Most accusations of criminal conduct are
understood by the average person as implying extremely damaging
facts.85
reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. See Oilman, 713 F.2d 838,
839 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam), vacated, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2662 (1985). Two months later, the entire court of appeals
voted to vacate the earlier opinion and rehear the case en banc. Oilman, 713 F.2d 838
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
Applying the "totality of circumstances" test to the statements found in Oilman,
Judge Starr concluded that all three assertions were protected opinion. Oilman, 750
F.2d 989-90. Starr began his analysis by examining the literary and broader social
context in which the statements were made. After noting that Evans' and Novak's
column was conspicuously placed on the "Op-Ed" page and that the article generally
concerned a debated public issue, Starr concluded that their statements were
"[pilainly part and parcel of [the] tradition of social and political criticism. Id. at 986
(footnote omitted).
After reviewing the context, Starr turned to the indiviual statements. Referring
to the statement characterizing Ollman as a "political activist," Starr noted that such
a phrase "is hopelessly imprecise and indefinite." Id. at 987. Turning to Evans' and
Novak's assertions regarding Olman's objectives as an instructor, Starr noted that
"this statement does not have a well-defined meaning or admit of a method of proof
as disproof," id. at 989, and that it was clearly just their interpretation of Ollman's
writings. Id. Finally, with respect to the anonymous professor's claim that "Ollman
has no status within the profession," Starr found a "confluence of factors," sug-
gesting the statement to be opinion. Id. at 989-90. After noting that the article was
found on the "Op-Ed page," that the person making the comment preferred to re-
main anonymous, and that the article included several facts which negated this claim,
Starr concluded that "the charge of'no status' in this context would plainly appear to
the average reader to be 'rhetorical hyperbole' . . . which in turn would lead the
reader to treat the statement as one of opinion." Id. at 990.
78. See id. at 979-84.
79. See id. at 979-81.
80. See id. at 981-82.
81. See id. at 982-83.
82. See id. at 983-84.
83. Id. at 980.
84. Id.
85. See Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980). In
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Some statements, however, are said to be so "loosely definable" or
"variously interpretable"86 that they are generally incapable of giv-
ing rise to clear factual implications.87 Typical examples of such
statements are derogatory epithets such as "bastard," "scoundrel,"
"bum," "jerk," and other remarks regularly tossed about in heated
argument. This is not to say that such statements cannot be damag-
ing. The point is that these types of remarks are usually so devoid of
factual content that, in reality, they are little more than general ex-
pressions of dislike.
The extent to which a statement is capable of being verified is an-
other factor considered under the "totality of circumstances" ap-
proach.88 This factor appears to be based largely on the dictum in
Gertz stating that "there is no such thing as a false idea."89 Accord-
ingly, if a statement is incapable of being verified in terms of truth or
falsity, it is likely to be deemed an opinion.90
Cianci, a mayor who was seeking reelection sued a magazine publisher for printing an
article stating that the mayor had once been accused of rape and had all charges
dropped after he made a $3000 "payoff." Id. at 56. The court held that the article
was much more than mere opinion:
The charges of rape and obstruction of justice were not employed in a
"loose, figurative sense" or as "rhetorical hyperbole." A jury could find that
the effect of the article was not simply to convey the idea that Cianci was a
bad man unworthy of the confidence of the voters of Providence but rather
to produce a specific image of depraved conduct-committing rape with the
aid of trickery, drugs and threats of death or serious injury, and the scuttling
of a well-founded criminal charge by buying off the victim .... To call such
charges merely an expression of "opinion" would be to indulge in Humpty-
Dumpty's use of language.
Id. at 64; see also Rinaldi, 42 N.Y.2d at 381-82, 366 N.E.2d at 1307, 397 N.Y.S.2d at
951 (discussing allegation of "corruption").
86. Olman, 750 F.2d at 980.
87. Particularly illustrative of this point is Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977). In Buckley, an author's political essay ac-
cused columnist and author William F. Buckley, Jr. of being a "fellow traveler" of
"fascists." Id. at 885 n. 1. Noting the wide disparity of meaning attached to the term
"facism," and that it was not clear from the context in which that term was used
which meaning was being asserted, the court declined to develop its own definition
for the term. The court concluded that such remarks "cannot be regarded as having
been proved to be statements of fact, among other reasons, because of the tremen-
dous imprecision of the meaning and usage of these terms in the realm of political
debate ..... Id. at 893.
88. SeeJanklow, 788 F.2d at 1302; Olman, 750 F.2d at 981-82.
89. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339. Harper and James explain this principle as follows:
A statement of fact is one capable of the quality of truth or falsity. A state-
ment of opinion does not have this quality. Shortly speaking, therefore, an
opinion is never "true" or "false" in the same sense as a statement of fact.
An opinion is a comment on or interpretation of fact. It is always related to
the facts it purports to interpret. Depending on its conformity with sound
critical standards, the opinion may be "sound" or "unsound," "good" or
"bad," "reasonable" or "unreasonable," but never "true" or "false."
1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.8 (1956).
90. See Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
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The third factor employed under the "totality of circumstances"
approach involves the literary context in which the assertion is
made.9t This factor requires a court to review the entire article in
which the allegedly factual statement is found to place it into con-
text.9 2 The use of any "cautionary language"93 such as "in my opin-
ion" must also be considered.94
When placed in the context of the article in which they appear,
many seemingly factual statements are readily disarmed. In Myers v.
Boston Magazine Co. ,95 the Massachussetts Supreme Judicial Court
held the defendant-publisher's statement that a local sportscaster
was "the only newscaster in town who is enrolled in a course for
remedial speaking"96 to be protected opinion. The statement ap-
peared in an article lampooning local sports celebrities in a series of
one-liners. After placing the statement in context, the court con-
cluded that the average reader would not take the statement
literally.97
The last factor a court is required to consider under the "totality
of circumstances" approach is the broader social context in which
the statement is made.98 "Some types of writing or speech by cus-
tom or convention signal to readers or listeners that what is being
read or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact."99 For example, seem-
ingly factual remarks flung about in public debate will often be un-
derstood to be nothing more than "rhetorical hyperbole"oo due to
the nature of the forum in which they are made. Particularly illustra-
tive of this point is Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation. 101 In
nom. Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977). A related issue is whether
the "falsity" question is one for the jury. Judge Starr, writing for the court in Olman,
concedes that the resolution of verifiability "will often be difficult to assay." Oilman,
750 F.2d at 982. Nevertheless, he feels that "[t]rial judges have rich experience in
the ways and means of proof and so will be particularly well situated to determine
what can be proven." Id. Accordingly, Starr feels the issue should be removed from
the province of the jury. Id. at 981. Several commentators, however, have disagreed
with Starr. See, e.g., Franklin & Brussel, supra note 19, at 865-66; Comment, supra
note 19, at 932-33.
91. SeeJanklow, 788 F.2d at 1302-03, Olman, 750 F.2d at 982-83; see also Gregory,
17 Cal. 3d at 601, 552 P.2d at 428, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
92. Olman, 750 F.2d at 982; Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 885 (La. 1977)
(restaurant review).
93. Olman, 750 F.2d at 982-83.
94. See Information Control Corp., 611 F.2d at 784 (noting that the allegedly libelous
statement was preceded by the phrase "in the Opinion of Genesis' management").
95. 380 Mass. 336, 403 N.E.2d 376 (1980).
96. Id. at 338, 403 N.E.2d at 377.
97. See id. at 342-43, 403 N.E.2d at 379.
98. SeeJanklow, 788 F.2d at 1303; Olman, 750 F.2d at 983.
99. Olman, 750 F.2d at 983.
100. Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970).
101. 17 Cal. 3d 596, 552 P.2d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1976).
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Gregory, a disagreement arose between the defendant employer and
its employees over the implementation of guidelines established to
govern a retroactive cost of living pay increase. Before an agreement
had been reached, the employees' union distributed various memo-
randa opposing the employer's position. The employer responded
by issuing statements in a bulletin suggesting that any delay in reach-
ing an agreement was due to certain union officials who were using
their political power to "seek personal gain and political prestige
rather than to serve the best interests of the members they were sup-
posed to represent." 0 2 The named union officials brought an action
for defamation claiming the statements to be factual. The court
characterized the assertions as opinion stating:
[W]here potentially defamatory statements are published in a pub-
lic debate, a heated labor dispute, or in another setting in which the
audience may anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade others to
their positions by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole, lan-
guage which generally might be considered as statements of fact
may well assume the character of statements of opinion.' 03
The "totality of circumstances" approach can be divided into two
basic parts or tests. Factors one, three, and four (the precision of the
language used, literary context, and social context) require a court to
analyze the varying levels of context in which the statement was
made. Factor two (the veracity of the statement) requires a court to
determine whether the statement can be proved true or false. These
tests have been the subject of considerable criticism.104
Proponents of the falsity approach take the position that requiring
the defamation plaintiff to prove the falsity of the defendant's asser-
tions would result in the avoidance of the fact-opinion distinction
altogether. 105 The argument is that since opinions cannot be false, a
plaintiff's case based on expressions of opinion will never make it
past the pleading stage because plaintiff will be unable to prove fal-
sity.t0 6 Therefore, proponents argue, the court will avoid having to
determine whether a statement is fact or opinion.10 7 The burden of
proving the statement is factual falls on the plaintiff by having to
prove falsity. The additional requirement, that plaintiff must prove
falsity with "convincing clarity,"108 further ensures that statements
102. Id. at 599, 552 P.2d at 427, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
103. Id. at 601, 552 P.2d at 428, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
104. See Note, supra note 18, at 1833-39; Note, supra note 75, at 105-14.
105. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 19, at 931-34; Franklin and Bussel, supra note
19, at 865-88.
106. See Franklin & Bussel, supra note 19, at 865-66.
107. Id. at 869.
108. Id. at 864. Franklin and Bussel argue:
Unless the courts require clear and convincing proof on the issue of the
statement's falsity, a public plaintiff would be able to prevail in the case sim-
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which "do not clearly lend themselves to being proved false"'10 9
never make it to the jury.
The conceded difficulty with this approach is that "[s]tatements
fall along a continuum of greater or lesser susceptibility to disproof,
and the line between judicially disprovable and nondisprovable
statements is not self-defining."l10 It is claimed, however, that plac-
ing the emphasis on disprovability "at least focuses the courts' judg-
ment on the correct issue in the same way that the catchall,
undefined word, 'opinion' obscures the issue." I '
This approach appears to have recently been given some support
by the United States Supreme Court in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps.l 2 In Hepps, the appellant published a series of articles in its
Philadelphia newspaper suggesting that the appellee, a principal
shareholder in a franchising corporation, had ties to organized crime
and used those ties to influence government officials.'13 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that the burden of proving the truth of
the assertion rested on the publisher'14 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that "the common-law presumption that defamatory
speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a
media defendant for speech of a public concern."' 1 5 In such cases,
plaintiff must prove falsity.
The effect of Hepps on the fact-opinion distinction, however, re-
mains uncertain. The Court did not address the issue of defamatory
opinion and it is not clear whether the decision was intended to have
any effect on this area of law. It is unlikely, however, that Hepps was
intended to have the effect desired by some commentators.
The American Law Institute has consistently maintained the posi-
tion that statements in the form of opinion do not have to be false to
be actionable." 6 The reason for this position is that applying the
ply by creating sufficient doubt in the jurors' minds as to the truth of the
statement and then by persuading those jurors to disbelieve the defendant's
protestations about honest belief or lack of recklessness. In other words,
courts should refrain from offering official determinations of what is true
and what is false in all but the clearest cases because an error in the court's
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would produce a much greater cost in
terms of the imposition of "official truth" and self-censorship than would a
similar error in favor of the defendant.
Id. at 864-85 (footnote omitted).
109. Id. at 864.
110. Id. at 879.
111. Id.
112. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
113. Id. at 1560.
114. Id. at 1561.
115. Id. at 1564.
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment a (1977). Under the
first Restatement, "[t]he expression of opinion was also actionable in a suit for defama-
tion despite the normal requirement that the communication be false as well as de-
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falsity requirement to statements in the form of opinion would per-
mit publishers to defame by implication. While it is true that opin-
ions can never be "true" or "false" in any objective sense of those
terms, it does not follow that they cannot imply the existence of false
statements of fact as their basis."l 7 This idea is best illustrated by
example. Assume A writes B a letter stating that he thinks C is "ut-
terly devoid of moral principles.""t8 Assuming A can be taken liter-
ally, most people reading such a statement would believe that A must
have a pretty good reason for making it. In other words, they would
infer the existence of defamatory facts to support A's assertion. If C
is actually a scrupulously moral person, he would be defamed by B's
inference of false defamatory facts tending to support A's asser-
tion. 19 Nevertheless, under the falsity approach, C would be unable
to recover since he could not prove the falsity of A's statement.120
Under the Restatement, however, such statements are generally action-
able since they imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts
as their basis.121
The falsity approach suffers not only from under-inclusiveness,
but over-inclusiveness as well. A literal application of the test can
lead to some statements being characterized as factual that would
have been privileged opinion under fair comment. Consider, for ex-
ample, the following passage in a letter by A to C: "I believe all red-
haired, green-eyed people are alcoholics. B has red hair and green
eyes. B must be an alcoholic." A's assertion "B must be an alco-
holic" is clearly susceptible to being categorized as true or false.122
However, since the passage indicates the facts upon which A's de-
duction is based, it would not be actionable under the Restatement.123
Proponents of the falsity approach concede its difficulty with respect
to these types of statements:
On the continuum between the disprovable and the nondisprov-
famatory. This position was maintained even though the truth or falsity of an
opinion- as distinguished from a statement of fact- is not a matter that can be
objectively determined and truth is a complete defense to a suit for defamation."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment a (1977) (citation omitted). The
falsity requirement is similarly inapplicable to statements in the form of opinions
under the second Restatement. See id. § 566; see also Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1625-32 (1977).
117. See infra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment b (1977).
119. See id.
120. See Franklin & Bussel, supra note 19, at 882 (discussing this particular
hypothetical).
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment b (1977).
122. Franklin and Bussel would impose liability in a similar hypothetical since the
charge of alcoholism is "sufficiently well defined to be disproved." Franklin & Bus-
sel, supra note 19, at 883.
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment c, illustration 4 (1977).
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able, there is a category of statements for which the determination
is difficult. If this is what the Restatement means by mixed opinion,
we view these statements as the hard cases, the resolution of which
depends upon the sound judgment of courts. Some statements will
be held to be actionable and some will not. A court that cannot
decide whether a statement is disprovable should err on the side of
nonactionability. 124
For a test whose primary virtues are claimed to be "simplicity"125
and predictability, the falsity approach seems to miss its mark with
respect to these types of opinions.
In light of the infirmities of the falsity approach, it is unlikely that
the Court intended Hepps to apply to statements in the form of opin-
ion. In reconciling the falsity requirement with statements in the
form of opinion, the Restatement, 126 as well as courts which have con-
sidered this issue,' 27 state that it is the falsity of the facts supporting
the assertion claimed to be an opinion, not the assertion itself to
which the requirement applies. "The New York Times test of truth and
falsity cannot apply to the actual opinion itself but must look to the
facts which form the basis for the opinion."1 28 "When they are true,
and when they are stated, the First Amendment shields from liability
an opinion which arises from them."1 2 9
With respect to the contextual part of the "totality of circum-
stances" approach, it is felt that the three-part test is so vague that, in
most cases, it is incapable of yielding predictable results.o
3 0 This
124. Franklin & Bussel, supra note 19, at 880 n.222.
125. See Note, supra note 75, at 105.
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment c (1977). The Restate-
ment gives the following outline of potential liability concerning the facts supporting
an opinion:
(2) If the defendant bases his expression of a derogatory opinion of the
plaintiff on his own statement of facts that are not defamatory, he is not
subject to liability for the factual statement - nor for the expression of opin-
ion, so long as it does not indicate an assertion of the existence of other,
defamatory, facts that would justify the forming of the opinion. The same
result is reached if the statement of facts is defamatory but true, or if the
defendant is not shown to be guilty of the requisite fault regarding the truth or the
defamatory character of the statement of facts (see § § 580A and 580B) ....
Id., illustration 5 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
Sections 580A and 580B, to which comment c refers, outline the standards of
fault applicable in defamation cases under New York Times Co. and Gertz. See infra
notes 245-51 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 556 (9th Cir. 1983); Hotchner, 551
F.2d at 913; McManus v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1383, 1385 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); see also Kapiloff, 27 Md. App. at 514 n.23, 343 A.2d at 263 n.23; Renwick v.
News and Observer Publishing Co., 63 N.C. App. 200, 231-38, 304 S.E.2d 593, 613-
16 (1983), rev'don other grounds, 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 469 U.S.
858 (1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment c (1977).
128. Kapiloff, 27 Md. App. at 514 n.23, 343 A.2d at 263 n.23.
129. Lewis, 710 F.2d at 556.
130. See Note, supra note 18, at 1846-48 (discussing the problem of "vagueness");
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three-part approach can be reduced to a single inquiry: would a rea-
sonable person consider the statements at issue to be fact or, con-
versely, opinion? What constitutes opinion under this approach is
nothing more than what a reasonable person thinks opinion is. Such
guidelines tend to produce inconsistency in the law and provide in-
sufficient direction for journalists attempting to tailor their writing to
avoid defamation liability.13
This is not to say that a basically broad contextual approach is not
useful in deciding some cases. In many cases, the social context in
which the statements were made has been determinative. This is
particularly true with respect to those cases involving satire, like My-
ers, or abusive language tossed about in public debate, like Gregory.
These, however, are the easy cases-cases in which the only real
aproach being applied is common sense. In other cases, context is
far from determinative. This is particularly true with respect to cases
where the author has not engaged in outright name calling, but has,
instead, stated a proposition and supported it with varying degrees
of fact, i.e., a "deductive-type" opinion.I32
Traditionally, the actionability of deductive-type opinions did not
depend so much upon the social context in which the statement was
made or whether it could be proven false, but upon the disclosure of
supporting facts.13S Reconsider the illustration given earlier con-
cerning A's assertion that "B must be an alcoholic." This assertion,
standing alone, is clearly defamatory and would probably be treated
as a statement of fact in a libel action.13 4 However, A's disclosure of
the facts upon which he bases his conclusion, i.e., that he believes all
red-haired, green-eyed persons are alcoholics, transforms this other-
wise actionable statement of fact into a mere expression of opin-
ion. 1S5 A well-drafted and carefully supported deductive-type
opinion, however, is not likely to be as easily recongized by the aver-
age reader or listener as mere interpretation or opinion. Courts that
have attempted to apply this approach confirm this difficulty.136
In summary, both the broad contextual approach and the falsity
approach are difficult, if not impossible, to apply to deductive-type
see also Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1307 (Bowman, J., dissenting) ("Clearly [the Olman fac-
tors] do not yield predictability, unless the prediction is that their application almost
always will result in keeping defamation actions brought by public officials and public
figures from reaching a jury").
131. See Note, supra note 18, at 1846-48.
132. See Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1221, 1249-50
(1976) (discussing "deductive opinions").
133. See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text (discussing the disclosure re-
quirement under the privilege of fair comment).
134. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 566 comment c, illustration 3 (1977).
135. See id., illustration 4.
136. SeeJanklow, 788 F.2d at 1303-05; Olman, 750 F.2d at 986-89.
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opinions. This difficulty stems from the fact that deductive-type
statements are not capable of being definitively labelled as either fact
or opinion. In light of this problem, and in light of the rationale
behind the opinion privilege, the drafters of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts appear to have been reluctant to fully embrace the absolute
protection for opinion suggested by Gertz and have, instead, retained
some of the common law vestiges of fair comment to deal with these
statements.137
B. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 566
The Restatement recognizes two types of opinions: those which are
supported by truly stated facts, and those which are not.138 The Re-
statement labels opinions supported by truly stated facts as "pure"
opinions. 139 According to the Restatement, it is only the "pure" type
of opinion to which the absolute immunity suggested by Gertz ap-
plies.140 Other types of opinions are referred to as "mixed" opin-
ions.141 A mixed opinion, under the Restatement, "is actionable only
if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the ba-
sis for the opinion."142 Therefore, as long as the basis for an opin-
ion is disclosed, it cannot generally be actionable under the
Restatement. 143
If Section 566 sounds similar to the disclosure requirement under
fair comment, couched in different language, that is because it basi-
cally is. Although the drafters of the Restatement deleted all prior sec-
tions on fair comment in response to Gertz,144 they apparently could
not part with the disclosure requirement. The reason is clear: the
opinion privilege makes no sense without it. Only when the reader
knows the basis for the author's opinions is he able to judge for him-
137. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment b (1977).
139. Id.
140. See id. comment c.
141. Id. comment b.
142. Id. § 566.
143. See, e.g., Lauderback, 741 F.2d at 195-98; Lewis, 710 F.2d at 553; Rinsley v.
Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1309-10 (10th Cir. 1983) (false light privacy action); Orr, 586
F.2d at 1114-15; National Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1299,
1305-12 (S.D. Ohio 1983); see also Underwood v. CBS, Inc., 150 Cal. App 3d 460, 198
Cal. Rptr. 48, 52-53 (1984); Burns v. Denver Post, Inc., 43 Colo. App. 325, 326-27,
606 P.2d 1310, 1311 (1979); Iverson v. Crow, 639 S.W.2d 118, 119 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Katlikoffv. The Community News, 89 NJ. 62, 72-73, 444 A.2d 1086, 1089-91
(1982); Pease v. Telegraph Publishing Co., 121 N.H. 62, 66, 426 A.2d 463, 465
(1981); Holy Spirit Ass'n., Etc. v. Sequoia Elsevier, 75 A.D.2d 523, 523-24, 426
N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (1980).
144. Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 606-10 (1938) with RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 606-10 (1977).
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self the propriety of the author's deductions.145 Only under such
circumstances will "the competition of other ideas" prevail as a cor-
rection device over a court of law. If supporting facts are not dis-
closed or otherwise known by the readers, they will generally be
unable to judge the propriety of the author's deductions and will nat-
urally infer the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts supporting
the author's derogatory conclusions.146 As stated in the comment to
Section 566:
A simple expression of opinion based on disclosed or assumed
nondefamatory facts is not itself sufficient for an action of defama-
tion, no matter how unjustified and unreasonable the opinion may
be or how derogatory it is. But an expression of opinion that is not
based on disclosed or assumed facts and therefore implies that
there are undisclosed facts on which the opinion is based, is treated
differently. The difference lies in the effect upon the recipient of
the communication. In the first case, the communication itself indi-
cates to him that there is no defamatory factual statement. In the
second, it does not, and if the recipient draws the reasonable con-
clusion that the derogatory opinion expressed in the comment
must have been based on undisclosed defamatory facts, the defend-
ant is subject to liability. 1 4 7
Under the Restatement, the emphasis is placed on the purpose and
policies underlying the opinion privilege rather than on definitively
labelling the statement as either fact or opinion. In this way, the slip-
pery determination as to whether a particular statement is one of fact
or opinion is largely avoided. Statements will generally be protected
as opinion if enough supporting facts are disclosed to the reader so
that he will recognize the statement as a comment on those facts and
will not infer the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts. The crit-
ical issue under the Restatement, therefore, is whether the propriety of
the statement is, in fact, capable of being scrutinized by readers or
listeners. This usually depends on the degree of disclosure of sup-
porting facts.148
The standard articulated by the Restatement - whether the state-
145. See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text; see also F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 89, at 370; Keeton, supra note 132, at 1250-51.
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment b (1977); see also F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 89, at § 5.8; R. SACK, supra note 5, at 158-59.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment c (1977).
148. In some cases, however, the disclosure requirement is not really necessary.
This is particularly true in cases involving ridicule or verbal abuse which are usually
understood to be mere opinion and nothing more. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 566 comments d and e. However, this is not to say that all such statements
are incapable of implying undisclosed facts. "The circumstances under which verbal
abuse is uttered affect the determination of how it is reasonably to be understood."
Id., comment e. If the circumstances indicate that the publisher intended his remarks
to be taken literally, he may be subject to defamation liability. See id.
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ment "implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the
basis for the opinion"149 -is a utopian one. When enough facts are
disclosed so that reasonable readers will not infer the existence of
undisclosed facts, readers are given just the right amount of facts to
judge the propriety of the conclusions being made. Under such cir-
cumstances, any erroneous conclusions reached by the author are
most likely to be "corrected" by the "competition of other ideas."
Similarly, this standard tends to minimize judicial interference with
editorial discretion. Authors are not required to supply every fact
pertinent to the subject of their comments. They need only supply
enough facts so that reasonable readers will not infer the existence of
undisclosed defamatory facts.
Unfortunately, this standard is not as utopian in practice. Just
what degree of disclosure is required to ensure that readers will not
infer the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts is unclear. 150
Chief Judge Robinson of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit has taken the position that an assertion
should be "absolutely privileged as opinion when it is accompanied
by a reasonably full and accurate narration of the facts pertinent to the
author's conclusion."15, What constitutes a "reasonable" amount of
pertinent supporting facts, according to Robinson, is "enough to en-
able the audience to fairly judge the conclusion stated."
' 15 2
While it is tempting, in the interest of maximizing the "correction"
of erroneous opinion, to agree with Chief Judge Robinson's require-
ment of "reasonably full and accurate" disclosure, such a require-
ment "sounds too much like an exercise of editorial judgment."' 5 3
149. Id. § 566.
150. See Note, supra note 18, at 1825-30.
151. Olman, 750 F.2d at 1024 (Robinson, CJ., dissenting in part) (emphasis in
original).
152. Id.
153. Ollman v. Evans, 713 F.2d 838, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald, J., concurring),
vacated, 750 F.2d 970 (1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
The Supreme Court has similarly indicated a distaste ofjudicial interference with
editorial judgment. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
(1974). In Tornillo, the Court stated:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to
the limitation on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public
issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair---constitute the exercise of
editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how govern-
mental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with
First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this
time.
Id.
It is not surprising that Robinsin's "full and accurate disclosure" requirement
has spurred considerable criticism from journalists and legal commentators. One
writer has labelled Robinson's requirement as "the most blatant assault against the
First Amendment in recent memory," a rule "that might well make every commenta-
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Under such a standard, separating the reasonableness of the disclo-
sure from the reasonableness of the deduction being made would be
impossible. In other words, courts would necessarily be called upon
to judge the propriety of authors' deductions. Such a prospect
stands in stark contradiction to the Supreme Court's pronouncement
in Gertz that "[h]owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on
the competition of other ideas."154
In practice, courts have required far less than "reasonably full and
accurate" dislosure. It would appear that the requirement that an
author must disclose enough supporting facts so that a reader will
not infer the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts merely re-
quires that the author dislose some facts tending to support the com-
ment being made. 155 As long as the comment bears some relation to
the facts presented it appears that it will be privileged opinion under
the Restatement.
For instance, in Lewis v. Time, Inc.,156 an attorney brought a defa-
mation action against a magazine publisher for an article entitled
"Those # * & !!! Lawyers." The article stated, in pertinent part:
If the legal profession has been reluctant to discipline its shadier
tor in the republic the timid prey of ambulance chasers." Tyrrell, Free the Commenta-
tors, Wash. Post, Aug. 15, 1983, at A15, cols. 2 and 3. Another writer claimed that
Robinson's rule was a "recipe for journalistic vapidity." Yoder, Protecting the Lazy
Reader, Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 1983, at A23, col. 4. Two legal commentators found it
"difficult to reconcile such a requirement with the First Amendment philosophy of
robust and unfettered debate." Shestack & Solano, Olman Signals the Demise of the
Opinion Defense, Legal Times, Dec. 19, 1983, at 29. Their concern stemmed primarily
from the procedural problems that Robinson's approach would be likely to create:
Under the Robinson rule, most statements of opinion that are alleged to be
defamatory will require a full-blown trial to determine what facts should
have been disclosed in connection with them. So long as the plaintiff can
posit some factual detail that might be material to the conclusion expressed
by the declarant, and that might somehow lead the reader to reach a conclu-
sion different from that of the declarant, the opinion privilege becomes un-
available and factual hearing must be held. The salutory effect of the
opinion privilege in allowing early termination of burdensome litigation by
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment will be ended.
Moreover, at the factual hearing itself, the burden of sustaining opinion
protection will be extremely difficult. Opinions are not asserted as in a Se-
curities and Exchange Commission prospectus containing the declarant's
underlying data. Proof of materiality and similar issues will be burdensome
for both the courts and litigants. The result, as perceptively implied by
Wald, may well be the demise of the opinion privilege itself and a narrowing
of First Amendment protection.
Id.
154. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40.
155. Very few cases have been found where liability has been imposed on an au-
thor despite the fact that he made some disclosure of facts tending to support his
conclusions. See infra notes 188-210 and accompanying text.
156. 710 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1983).
19871
25
Miesen: The Fact-Opinion Dilemma in First Amendment Defamation Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
practitioners, it has been swift to crack down on anyone threaten-
ing to cut fees or reduce business.
* * *
Thanks to painfully slow bar discipline, a northern California law-
yer named Jerome Lewis is still practicing law despite a $100,000
malpractice judgment against him in 1970 and a $60,000 judgment
including punitive damages in 1974 for defrauding clients of
money .... 157
Lewis argued that the article was actionable since it characterized
him as dishonest and suggested that he should be disbarred.158 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the inference that
the plaintiff was a "shady practitioner" was protected because the
article set forth facts tending to support that conclusion, i.e., state
court judgments against him for fraud and malpractice.159
Similarly, in Underwood v. CBS, Inc. ,160 a newspaper editor brought
an action for defamation against CBS in connection with a biography
of reputed mafia figure Jimmy Fratianno. The portion of the biogra-
phy objected to by the plaintiff involved an alleged scam by reputed
ganster Mickey Cohen. In the 1940's, Cohen was apparently in-
volved in a fund-raising benefit to buy arms for Israel.161 After Co-
hen had collected almost $1 million, Fratianno claims that Cohen
showed him an article in The Los Angeles Herald reporting the sinking
of a ship loaded with arms. 162 Fratianno then related Cohen's repu-
tation for money-making schemes, his friendship with the plantiff,
and that the plaintiff had printed stories for Cohen before.163 Fra-
tianno concluded that there never were any arms purchased, there
was no ship, and that the plaintiff helped Cohen defraud donators by
printing the story.' 64 The plaintiff argued that the article inferred
the fact that she was an accomplice to a crime.165 The California
Court of Appeals, however, found Fratianno's conclusions to be pro-
tected opinion since the underlying facts upon which the conclusion
was based were stated, i.e., Cohen's reputation for fraudulent
money-making schemes, his involvement in the fund-raising activity
for Israel, his friendship with the plaintiff, and the appearance of the
article in The Los Angeles Herald.166
The opinion privilege under Section 566 will not even be lost
157. Id. at 550-5 1.
158. See id. at 552.
159. See id. at 555.
160. 150 Cal. App. 3d 460, 198 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1984).
161. Id. at 463, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 463, n.2, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 50, n.2
165. See id. at 463, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
166. See id. at 468, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 53. The court concluded that "the average
reader would recognize that in the process of telling Cohen's story secondhand, Fra-
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when the conclusion reached by the author is not justified by the
facts stated or is an extremely harsh judgment on those facts.167 In
Orr v. Argus-Press Co.,168 a local developer planned to build a shop-
ping center. To raise money, the plaintiff prepared and distributed a
prospectus to local investors describing the project.169 The plaintiff
was only able to raise a small percentage of the capital he needed
and decided to return the money he had collected.t o The plaintiff
was later indicted on charges of failing to comply with state security
laws concerning the venture. After the indictment, the defendant
published an article containing all the relevant facts, but character-
ized the shopping mall proposal using terms such as "fraud,"
"phony," and "swindle," suggesting that the plaintiff had attempted
to defraud local investors.t 7, The plaintiff brought an action for def-
amation. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, since the
publisher accurately reported the underlying facts, the statement was
privileged regardless of the fact that the venture was characterized in
"strong terms."1 7 2
Where an author has failed to disclose at least some facts tending
to support his defamatory conclusions, however, courts have im-
posed liability under Section 566.173 In Adler v. American Standard
Cororation,t74 plaintiff, Gerald Adler, was hired by the defendant to
conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the management and opera-
tions of the defendant's commercial printing division. During the
course of his investigation, Adler discovered numerous inadequacies
including several improper and possibly illegal practices. 175 On sev-
eral occasions, Adler reported these findings to his immediate super-
tianno was overlaying the alleged facts with his personal opinion of Underwood's
part in the hoax." Id.
167. "A simple expression of opinion based on disclosed or assumed nondefama-
tory facts is not itself sufficient for an action of defamation, no matter how unjustified and
unreasonable the opinion may be or how derogatory it is." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 566 comment c (1977) (emphasis added).
168. 586 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979).
169. Orr, 586 F.2d at 1110.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1110-11.
172. Id. at 1115.
173. See, e.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572, 576 (D. Md.
1982); see also Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gellert, 438 So. 2d 923, 926-28 (Fla. Ct. App.
1983); Nevada Ind. Broadcasting Corp, 99 Nev. at 410-12, 664 P.2d at 341-43; Kutz v.
Independent Publishing Co., 97 N.M. 243, 244-46, 638 P.2d 1088, 1090-91, appeal
after remand, 101 N.M. 587, 686 P.2d 277 (1984); Bock v. Zittenfield, 66 Or. Ct. App.
97, 101-02, 672 P.2d 1237, 1239-40, pet. denied, 677 P.2d 702 (1984); Braig v. Field
Communications, 310 Pa. Super. 569, 581-82, 456 A.2d 1366, 1372-73, cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 2341 (1984).
174. 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982).




Miesen: The Fact-Opinion Dilemma in First Amendment Defamation Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
iors, James Kinealy and James Sinclair, but received little
consideration from them. 176 During his last confrontation with
Kinealy and Sinclair, Adler announced his intention to disclose his
findings to headquarters personnel at the next group meeting.177
Kinealy and Sinclair insisted on Adler's resignation, and when he re-
fused, they fired him.178 Kinealy and Sinclair then published state-
ments on behalf of the defendant stating that Adler was terminated
"for unsatisfactory performance." ' 179 The communication failed to
disclose any facts supporting its conclusion. The defendant claimed
that the communication was privileged opinion. The court dis-
agreed.18 0 After discussing Section 566, the court concluded that
"the reasonable implication from the allegedly defamatory state-
ments is that plaintiff was guilty of some misconduct, negligence or
incompetence in the performance of his duties."1 8l
The defendant in Braig v. Field Communications 182 similarly failed to
disclose the basis of his defamatory conclusions concerning the
plaintiff. In Braig, a judge brought a defamation action against an
assistant district attorney and a television station. The assistant dis-
trict attorney appeared on a weekly minority-affairs news program to
discuss certain incidents where police were alleged to have used ex-
cessive force against blacks.183 Another participant in the program
was highly critical of the decision of the district attorney's office to
use a certain attorney in a sensitive police brutality case since that
attorney had been thrown out of the plaintiff's court for
prosecutorial misconduct in an earlier police brutality case.' 8 4 The
assistant district attorney responded to this critcism by stating that,
"Judge Braig is no friend of the police brutality unit. I don't care
who we sent in to try that case, in my opinion, that case was going to
get blown out." 8 5 The court disagreed with the defendant's claim
that the assistant district attorney's remarks were privileged opin-
ion.18 6 The court held that the remarks were made on the basis of
undisclosed defamatory facts and were thus actionable under Section
566.187
Several courts have imposed liability under Section 566 despite




180. See Adler, 538 F. Supp. at 576.
181. Id.
182. 310 Pa. Super. 569, 456 A.2d 1366, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2341 (1984).
183. Id. at 572, 456 A.2d at 1368.
184. Id. at 573, 456 A.2d at 1368-69.
185. Id. at 573, 456 A.2d at 1369.
186. Id. at 577, 456 A.2d at 1372.
187. Id. at 578, 456 A.2d at 1373.
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the fact that the defendants disclosed the facts upon which they
based their defamatory conclusions.188 In Cianci v. New Times Publish-
ing Co.,i89 the defendant published an article suggesting that Mayor
Vincent Cianci, Jr. raped a woman in 1966 and then, for $3,000,
"managed to buy his way out of a possible felony [rape] charge."190
The article exhaustively set forth the facts upon which the defend-
ant's conclusion was based, including numerous statements from the
victim, reports from the State Crime Laboratory, and statements
from the polygraph expert who had performed polygraph examina-
tions on both Cianci and the victim.'91 The article then explained
that the reason the victim's civil suit was dropped was because her
attorney felt that she would be unable to endure a full-blown trial.192
The article quoted the victim as stating that she had received a settle-
ment of $3,000.193 Faced with the inadmissibility of the results of
the lie detector tests and the unavailability of the victim as a witness,
the article stated that the prosecuting attorney similarly decided to
drop the case.194 The article concluded by stating that "[flor the
nominal sum of $3,000, Cianci had managed to buy his way out of a
possible felony charge."195
The defendant argued that this statement was privileged opinion
since his article set forth the facts upon which it was based.196 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed stating that "opinions
may support a defamation action when they convey false representa-
tions of defamatory fact, even though there is no implication that the
writer is relying on facts not disclosed ... *"197
Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 198 involves a similar set of
facts. In Rinaldi, the defendant published a book by well-known in-
vestigative jounalist Jack Newfield criticizing the criminal justice sys-
tem in New York.199 Part of Newfield's book consisted of reprinted
articles which were highly critical of the plaintiff's performance as a
judge.200 Newfield stated that he had spent weeks going over Ri-
naldi's dispositions. The book discussed several of Rinaldi's disposi-
188. See, e.g., Cianci, 639 F.2d at 64-65; Rinaldi, 42 N.Y.2d at 381-82, 366 N.E.2d at
1307, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
189. 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980).
190. Id. at 58.
191. See id. at 56-58.
192. Id. at 57.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 58.
196. Id. at 64.
197. Id. at 65.
198. 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969
(1977).
199. Id. at 374, 366 N.E.2d at 1302, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
200. See id. at 375-76, 366 N.E.2d at 1303, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
1987]
29
Miesen: The Fact-Opinion Dilemma in First Amendment Defamation Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
tions in recent cases. Based on these dispositions, Newfield
concluded that the Rinaldi was "incompetent and probably cor-
rupt." 2ot The court agreed with the defendant's argument that the
allegation of "incompetence" was privileged opinion,202 but dis-
agreed with respect to the allegation of "corruption."203 The court
concluded that "[a]ccusations of criminal activity, even in the form of
opinion, are not constitutionally protected."204 However, since Ri-
naldi was unable to prove the requisite degree of fault, the court re-
versed and granted Newfield's motion for summary judgment.205
The courts' analysis in Cianci and Rinaldi is difficult to square with
Section 566. In both cases, the defendants set forth some facts tend-
ing to support their defamatory conclusions. Neither case suggests
that any further undisclosed defamatory facts were implied. The
findings in these cases can, therefore, only be analyzed as consistent
with Section 566 if the supporting facts were false or otherwise de-
fective in some manner.
It would appear that, in both cases, there were serious doubts as to
the veracity of the underlying facts. In Cianci, the court specifically
noted the plaintiff's allegation that the article was "replete with mis-
statements of fact," 206 and stated that "[i]n such a case it is meaning-
less to say that the opinion is protected, when the facts are not."207
The court in Rinaldi, similarly noted the inaccuracies present in the
defendant's article. 20 8 If these cases are asserting that when a de-
fendant's opinions are based upon false statements of fact and plain-
tiff can prove the requisite degree of fault, the defendant's opinion is
not privileged, they are in accord with Section 566.209 If, however,
they are asserting that allegations of specific misconduct based on
disclosed facts, regardless of the truth or falsity of those facts, are
not privileged under Section 566, they are mistaken.210
In summary, the drafters of the Restatement have rejected the abso-
lute protection for opinion suggested by Gertz. Although, in re-
sponse to Gertz, all sections dealing with fair comment have been
201. Id. at 376, 366 N.E.2d at 1303, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
202. Id. at 381, 366 N.E.2d at 1306, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
203. Id. at 381-82, 366 N.E.2d at 1307, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 382-86, 366 N.E.2d at 1307-09, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 951-53.
206. Cianci, 639 F.2d at 66.
207. Id. at 67.
208. See Rinaldi, 42 N.Y.2d at 366-67, 366 N.E.2d at 1303-04, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
209. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (discussing the falsity require-
ment with respect to statements in the form of opinion).
210. If the author has disclosed enough true facts supporting his allegation of spe-
cific misconduct so that readers will not infer the existence of undisclosed defamatory
facts supporting that allegation, the allegation is protected opinion under Section
566. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comments b and c (1977).
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deleted, 211 the disclosure requirement has been retained. Under
Section 566, a statement in the form of an opinion is actionable only
if it implies the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts as its basis.
In practice, a statement will generally be privileged as opinion under
the Restatement as long as the author disloses some facts tending to
support his conclusion.
IV. SYNTHESIS
As things currently stand, in dealing with a statement in the form
of an opinion in a defamation action, some courts apply the "totality
of circumstance" approach,212 some the Restatement approach,213 and
others both.214 Even those courts which most adamantly support the
"totality of circumstances" approach, however, recognize the impor-
tance of the disclosure requirement and tend to factor it into their
analyses. 215 Indeed, it would appear that the third factor under the
"totality of circumstances" approach (the literary context in which
the statement is made) implicitly incorporates the disclosure require-
ment. Unfortunately, this has not cured the infirmities of the "total-
ity of circumstances" approach.
The problem with the "totality of circumstances" approach is that
the other three factors are essentially dead weight which tend to
make its application more confusing and its outcome less predict-
able.216 Only two inquiries need be made when dealing with a state-
ment alleged to be an opinion. The first inquiry is whether the
assertion is capable of being taken literally by reasonable persons. If
the assertion is such that it would not be taken literally by reasonable
211. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 606-610 (1938).
212. See supra notes 77-104 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 157-88.
214. See, e.g.,Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1302-06; Keller, 778 F.2d at 717-18; Lewis, 710
F.2d at 553-57; Rinsley, 700 F.2d at 1309; Froess v. Bulman, 610 F. Supp. 332, 339-40
(D.R.I. 1984); see also Burns, 43 Colo. App. at 327, 606 P.2d at 1317; Meyers v. Plan
Takoma, Inc., 472 A.2d 44, 47-48 (D.C. Ct. App. 1983).
215. See, e.g., Olman, 750 F.2d at 987-89. In analyzing Evans' and Novak's asser-
tions stating that Professor Olman was "widely viewed in his profession as a political
activist," see supra note 77 and accompanying text, the Olman court stated:
Evans and Novak set out facts which signalled the reader that this statement
represents a characterization arising from the columnists' view of the facts.
In the paragraph immediately following this statement, the column indi-
cated that Mr. Ollman on no less than two occasions finished dead last
among all candidates for election to the governing Council of the American
Political Science Association .... A reasonable reader would conclude that
the authors' judgment that Mr. Ollman was "widely viewed as a political
activist" was a characterization based upon the latter's unsuccesful electoral
endeavors within his profession.
Olman, 750 F.2d at 987-88.
216. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of
vagueness and unpredictability created by the "totality of circumstances" approach).
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persons, the statement is clearly mere opinion.217 Two Supreme
Court decisions are particularly illustrative of this point.
In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler,2'8 plaintiff, a
real estate developer and state legislator, brought suit against the
defendant newspaper for publishing two articles concerning his in-
volvement in several city counsel meetings. Prior to these meetings,
plaintiff was engaged in negotiations with the city to secure certain
zoning variances that would permit him to build high-density hous-
ing on land which he owned.219 At the same time, the city sought to
purchase other land owned by the plaintiff for the construction of a
new high school.220 The defendant published two articles stating
that, at the meetings, some observers characterized the plaintiff's ne-
gotiating position as "blackmail." 2 2 1 Noting that the defendant
published "accurate and full" 2 22 reports, the court concluded:
It is simply impossible to believe that a reader who reached the
word "blackmail" in either article would not have understood ex-
actly what was meant: it was Bresler's public and wholly legal nego-
tiating proposals that were being criticized. No reader could have
thought that either the speakers at the meetings or the newspaper
articles reporting their words were charging Bresler with the com-
mission of a criminal offense. On the contrary, even the most care-
less reader must have perceived that the word was no more that
rhetorical hyperbole .... 223
In Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers
v. Austin, 224 the Court was presented with a similar set of facts. In
Letter Carriers, names of several nonunion employees of the local post
office were included on a list circulated by union employees. 2 25 At-
tached to the list was a famous piece of trade literature defining the
nature of a "scab." 226 The piece of literature concluded with a state-
ment claiming that "a SCAB is a traitor to his god, his country, his
family, and his class."227 The plaintiffs claimed that this passage
could be read to charge them as being "traitors." 2 28 The Court dis-
agreed. After quoting the Gertz dicta, 229 the Court found that it
would be "impossible to believe that any reader ... would have un-
217. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comments d and e (1977).
218. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
219. Id. at 7.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 13.
223. Id. at 14 (footnote omitted).
224. 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (decided on the same day as Gertz).
225. Id. at 267.
226. Id. at 268.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 283.
229. Id. at 284.
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derstood the newsletter to be charging the appellees with commit-
ting the criminal offense of treason."23
0
Greenbelt and Letter Carriers show that if the assertion at issue is such
that it would not be taken literally by reasonable persons, a court
need not go any further. In such cases, the statement is clearly opin-
ion. If, on the other hand, the statement is such that it could be
taken literally, further inquiry is required.
The second inquiry is whether recipients of the communication
have the ability to assess the propriety of the assertions being made.
This generally requires that they know the factual basis for the au-
thor's conclusions. If the author does not provide any of the facts
upon which he bases his conclusions, unless those facts are generally
known, two undesirable events are likely to occur. First, the recipi-
ents will naturally infer the existence of undisclosed facts tending to
support the author's conclusions. 23 1 And, if those inferences are de-
famatory, the target of the conclusion will have been defamed by im-
plication.232 Second, if the conclusion is erroneous, it will have a
lesser chance of being "corrected" by the "competition of other
ideas." 233
This two-step approach is essentially the approach suggested by
Section 566. It is submitted that this approach is superior for several
reasons. First, it is much more simple, and easier to apply than its
four-factored counterpart. Under the Restatement, the slippery task of
labelling a particular statement as either fact or opinion is largely
avoided. Under the Restatement, it is only necessary to determine
whether there has been proper disclosure of supporting facts. The
emphasis is not so much on labelling a particular statement as fact or
opinion as it is on determining whether a statement is worthy of pro-
tection. A statement is worthy of protection when the author has
disclosed enough facts to enable the reader to judge the propriety of
the expression without inferring the existence of further undisclosed
defamatory factual support.
Second, the approach suggested by Section 566 is much more pre-
dictable and consistent than the "totality of circumstances" ap-
proach. The plight of the journalist under the "totality of
circumstances" approach has been described by one commentator as
follows:
The reader-oriented approach places the journalist in the precari-
ous position of guessing how a contention will be regarded by the
public. The truth or falsity test forces the journalist to predict how
an allegation will be construed by a court. The textual approach
230. Id. at 285 (footnote omitted).
231. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
233. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40; see also supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
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and the broader contextual analysis also place the journalist in the
difficult position of speculating as to where and when his or her
works will be published, and further require the journalist to guess
which of the surrounding circumstances might be deemed
relevant. 2
34
Under the Restatement approach, on the other hand, the journalist is
given a greater degree of control over his fate. To avoid defamation
liability, he needs only to supply some factual support to his
conclusions. 23 5
Third, the emphasis under the Restatement is on the underlying
purpose and policies behind the opinion privilege, rather than on the
mechanics of distinguishing fact from opinion. Opinions, as recog-
nized by the Court in Gertz, are privileged under defamation law be-
cause they have the capacity to be "corrected" by the "competition
of other ideas." 23 6 To allow opinion to be subject to correction in a
court of law would be to greatly compromise our system of free
speech and press. However, in order for the marketplace of ideas to
be an effective correction device for erroneous opinion, the opinion
must have the capacity to be corrected. That is, recipients at least
need to know the facts upon which the author has based his opinion.
When such facts are not stated or otherwise known, the marketplace
of ideas becomes an ineffective correction device and a court of law
becomes the appropriate forum. By placing the emphasis on these
simple principles, the confusion that has been created in this area of
the law disappears,journalists are given clear standards to work with,
and the multitude of defamation suits is hopefully reduced.
V. "FAULT" AND THE OPINION PRIVILEGE
The focus of this Note thus far has been on the disclosure require-
ment originally found under the privilege of fair comment. But what
has happened to the other elements of fair comment, i.e., the "public
concern"2 3 7 requirement and the absence of malice requirement?
2 3 8
The answer is that both continue, for the most part, to be very much
a part of modern defamation law, but in a different way than they
were applied under fair comment.
In general, the extent to which a statement involves a public offi-
cial 23 9 or public figure,240 now defines the degree of "malice" which
a plaintiff must prove in a defamation action. The term "malice,"
234. Note, supra note 18, at 1846.
235. See supra notes 157-73 and accompanying text.
236. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339; see also supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
239. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254.
240. See Curtis Publishing Co., 388 U.S. at 130.
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however, has taken on a few new dimensions. Under fair comment,
"malice" existed when the defendant published defamatory matter
"solely for the purpose of causing harm to the plaintiff."241 Under
modern defamation law, "malice" has basically taken two forms.
When the topic of the defamation concerns a public official or pub-
lic figure, the first form of "malice" will generally apply. This form
of malice is extremely difficult to prove. "[T]he principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open," 242
requires a plaintiff to make a higher showing of culpability than when
the speech is of a purely private concern. In such cases, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant's assertion was made "with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not." 2 43 The plaintiff is further required to prove this stan-
dard with "convincing clarity."244
A less stringent standard is applied in cases where the plaintiff is
neither a public official nor a public figure.245 The rationale for dis-
tinguishing between "public" plaintiffs and "private" plaintiffs has
been stated as follows:
The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help - using
available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. Public offi-
cals and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to
the channels of effective communication and hence have a more
realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private in-
241. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 566 (1)(c)(1938); see also Chery, 114 Iowa at
298, 86 N.W. at 323.
242. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
243. Id. at 279-80. In New York Times, the defendant publisher printed a political
advertisement which included several false statements of fact concerning repressive
police action against demonstrators in Montgomery, Alabama. The plaintiff Sullivan,
Commissioner of Public Affairs, brought suit alleging that since the conduct of Mont-
gomery police was his responsibility, the advertised averments of police misconduct
were, in effect, averments of his own misconduct. Id. at 258-59.
The trial court instructed the jury that the statements in the advertisement were
libelous per se. Id. at 262. The jury awarded $500,000, which was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Alabama. Id. at 261-64.
The United States Supreme Court reversed holding that the rule applied by the
lower courts was "constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for
freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official
conduct." Id. at 264 (footnote omitted). In such cases, the Court stated that:
The constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that prohibits a pub-
lic official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "ac-
tual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disre-
gard of whether it was false or not.
Id. at 279-80.
244. Id. at 285-86.
245. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-52.
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dividuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more
vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is
correspondingly greater.
2 4 6
In light of this policy, the "private" plaintiff is faced with a much less
demanding standard of "malice" to prove. Generally, such plaintiffs
need only show that the defendant was negligent with respect to the
truth of the material published.247
It should be noted that this has been a most cursory explanation of
the fault requirement under modem defamation law. This topic has
many nuances and complexities that are far beyond the scope of this
Note. 248 The fault requirement, however, is rarely discussed in con-
junction with the opinion privilege, and a brief explanation is
appropriate.
The difficulty of the malice requirement with respect to opinions is
that both standards are articulated in terms of the falsity of the asser-
tion being made. Since opinions can be neither true nor false, the
standard is seemingly inapplicable. However, with respect to falsity,
the malice standards do not apply to the opinion itself, but to the
246. Id. at 344 (footnote omitted).
247. See id. at 347. In Gertz, plaintiff Gertz, a prominent Chicago attorney, had
represented the family of a youth shot and killed by a Chicago policeman. Robert
Welch, Inc., a right-wing political group associated with theJohn Birch Society, char-
acterized Gertz' involvement as part of a nationwide conspiracy to discredit local law
enforcement agencies with the goal of establishing a national police force to support
a communist dictatorship. Id. The respondent's article contained several inaccura-
cies such as stating that Gertz has been a former official of the "Marxist League for
Industrial Democracy, originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist Society .... "
Id. at 326. Respondent's magazine portrayed Gertz as an architect of a "frame-up."
Id. The article also labelled Gertz as a "Leninist" and "Communist-fronter." Id.
Gertz brought a diversity action for libel in Federal District Court in Illinois. See
Gertz, 306 F. Supp. 310. Following a jury verdict in favor of Gertz, the trial court
entered judgment for Robert Welch, Inc. notwithstanding the jury's verdict, holding
that the New York Times standard governed the case despite the fact that Gertz was
neither a public official nor a public figure. See Gertz, 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill.
1970). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. See Gertz, 471 F.2d at 806.
The Supreme Court reversed. "The New York Times standard defines," said Jus-
tice Powell, "the level of constitutional protection appropriate to the context of defa-
mation of a public person." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342. With respect to plaintiffs who are
not public persons (public figures or public officials), Justice Powell stated:
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a pub-
lisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individ-
ual. This approach provides a more equitable boundary between the
competing concerns involved here. It recognizes the strength of the legiti-
mate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury
to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of
strict liability for defamation.
Id. at 347-48 (footnote omitted).
248. For a comprehensive discussion of the fault requirement under modern defa-
mation law see R. SACK, supra note 5, at 187-265.
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facts supporting the opinion.249 Applying these standards, "malice"
with respect to falsity, will exist in either of two cases:
(1) where the plaintiff is either a public official, or a public figure,
and the defendant published the opinion with knowledge that
the facts supporting it were false or careless whether they
were true or not; or
(2) where the plaintiff is neither a public official nor a public fig-
ure, and the defendant published negligently as to the truth of
the facts supporting the opinion.
2 50
While it is clear that the fault standards apply to an author's culpa-
bility involving the falsity of the background facts, it is less clear
whether they are also applicable to an author's culpability in failing
to properly disclose those facts. According to ChiefJudge Robinson,
"[t]he considerations underlying the standards of care developed in
New York Times and its progeny for measuring liability for defamatory
falsehood apply equally to situations wherein an author states the
background facts incompletely or incorrectly."251 Robinson summa-
rizes this approach as follows:
[w]hen the plaintiff claiming defamation is a public figure or public
official, the pertinent inquiry should be whether the author's failure
to provide . . . background data is traceable to actual malice or
recklessness. When the plaintiff is a private figure, the critical
question should be whether the author was negligent, or violated a
higher local-law standard of conduct applicable, in setting out the
factual basis for the hybrid statement. If the error or omission in
the recital of predicate data is found nonculpable under the rele-
vant standard, the hybrid statement ... should .. be absolutely
privileged as opinion even though it may mislead the reader and
damage the victim's reputation. 252
In light of its reluctance to apply any form of strict liability in defa-
mation actions, it is likely that the Supreme Court would favor
Robinson's approach. As the Court has recently stated:
[Some] sort of inaccuracy . . . is commonplace in the forum of ro-
bust debate to which the New York Times rule applies .... Realisti-
cally, . . . some error is inevitable; and the difficulties of separating
fact from fiction convinced the Court in New York Times, Butts, Gertz,
and similar cases to limit liability to instances where some degree
of culpability is present in order to eliminate the risk of undue self-
censorship and the suppression of truthful material..."
[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . must
be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breath-
ing space' that they 'need to survive.' "253
249. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
250. Need this footnote to balance with 250 in text.
251. Olman, 750 F.2d at 1025 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting in part).
252. Id. n.83.
253. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Credit Union, 466 U.S. 485, 513 (1984) (citations
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In summary, it would appear that there are two types of standards
of fault applicable to opinions: one relating to the veracity of the
underlying facts and the other relating to the quantum of underlying
facts. Consequently, even if there has been an adequate disclosure
of supporting facts, if those facts are false and the plaintiff can prove
malice, the opinion is actionable. Similarly, even if the supporting
facts are completely true as stated, if the author has failed to supply
the requisite degree of factual support, and the plaintiff can prove
malice, the opinion is actionable.
CONCLUSION
Under the common law qualified privilege of fair comment, criti-
cism or comment was privileged in defamation law as long as it in-
volved a matter of public concern, the basis of the opinion was
disclosed by the publisher or otherwise known by the reader, and the
criticism was not made for the sole purpose of causing harm to an-
other. In 1974, the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, in dicta,
used language which has been interpreted as granting absolute pro-
tection to all opinion. This interpretation has necessarily led to a
multitude of vague and problematic approaches to distinguish fact
from opinion, resulting in inconsistency and unpredictability in this
area of the law.
It is undesirable to grant absolute protection to all opinion and it
is unlikely that the Supreme Court intended to do so. Professor Hill
has observed that "[t]he problem of defamatory opinion was not re-
motely in issue in Gertz, and there is no evidence that the Court was
speaking with an awareness of the rich and complex history of the
struggle of the common law to deal with this problem." 2 54 Several
members of the Court have conceded Hill's proposition. Dissents
from denials of certiorari reveal that at least two justices feel that the
Gertz dictum has been misinterpreted. On one occasion, Justice (now
ChiefJustice) Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, referred to Profes-
sor Hill's article and stated that he was "confident [that] this Court
did not intend to wipe out this 'rich and complex history' with the
two sentences of dicta in Gertz ... "255 Even more recently, Rehn-
quist has stated:
At the time I joined the opinion in Gertz, . . . I regarded... [the Gertz
dicta] as an exposition of the classical views of Thomas Jefferson
and Oliver Wendell Holmes that there was no such thing as a false
omitted) (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171-72 (1979) and New York Times,
376 U.S. at 271-72, quoting in turn NAACP v. Buttons, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
254. Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205,
1239 (1976).
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"idea" in the political sense, and that the test of truth for political
ideas is indeed the market place and not the courtroom. I continue
to believe that is the correct meaning of the ... passage. But it is
apparent ... that lower courts have seized upon the word "opin-
ion" in the second sentence to solve with a meat axe a very subtle
and difficult question, totally oblivious "of the rich and complex
history of the struggle of the common law to deal with this
problem." 2 56
It would, therefore, appear most indefinite as to whether the quali-
fied privilege of fair comment has been permanently escalated into
the absolute privilege of opinion via the Gertz dicta. As one well-
respected commentator has observed: "It would be dangerous to as-
sert conclusively that all opinion is ipso facto protected by the First
Amendment until the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to rule
on the validity of the syllogism which it suggested in Gertz." 2 57
Statements alleged to be opinion should be priviliged only when
the recipient of the communication has the ability to judge the pro-
priety of the deductions being made for himself. This generally re-
quires that an author disclose the facts upon which he bases his
opinion, and that those facts be true. This Note generally supports
the requirement under the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 566
that an author should disclose enough supporting facts so that a
reader will not infer the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts as
the basis for the opinion.
Under this approach, the slippery issue as to whether a particular
statement is one of fact or opinion is largely avoided. There is no
need for a court to engage in "four-factor frameworks, three-pro-
nged tests, [or]... two-tiered analyses."258 Instead, it is only neces-
sary to determine whether there has been an appropriate disclosure
of true supporting facts. This approach is more receptive to consti-
tutional principals of free speech and press and will eliminate much
of the uncertainty and confusion in this area of the law created by
courts attempting to make the illusory distinction between fact and
opinion.
. Miesen
256. Olman v. Evans, 471 U.S. 1127, 1129 (1985) (quoting Hill, supra note 254, at
1239).
257. R. SACK, supra note 5, at 182 (emphasis in original).
258. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 994 (Bork, J., concurring).
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